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Use and Rights in Groundwater.
WATER LAW- GROUNDWATER -Land
Alameda County Water District v. Niles Sand and Gravel Co., 37 Cal.
App. 3d 924, 112 Cal. Rptr. 846 (Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied -......
95 S. Ct. 128 (1974).*
U.S.

Plaintiff Niles Sand and Gravel Co., Inc. operates commercial sand and gravel pits in the Niles Basin in Alameda
County, California. Since 1935, the defendant Alameda
County Water District has been engaged in a continuous program of groundwater replenishment within the Niles Basin.
The water district accomplishes this recharge by collecting
water in sufficient quantity on the surface so that the water
will percolate beneath the surface into the basin. The purposes for this recharge program are two fold: first, to provide
storage of fresh water for future consumption, and second,
to prevent salt water intrusion into the basin from nearby
San Francisco Bay.
The surface elevation at Niles Sand and Gravel Company's
pits is 60 feet, and the natural elevation of the water table is
20 feet above sea level. At the time of the trial some of Niles'
pits had been dug to 120-125 feet below the surface elevation,
80-85 feet below the water table. Naturally, the mining operation expected to encounter and did encounter water. To
deal with this water, the Niles Company installed pumping
facilities and, at the time of the trial, was emptying water
from the gravel pits into Alameda Creek which then flows into
San Francisco Bay at the rate of five million gallons per
day--enough fxesh water to meet the daily needs of a city of
30,000. Thus the trial court was faced with the situation of
one party putting water into the ground and the other party
taking it out as fast as he could.
The Niles Company and its lessor, Inland Aggregates,
Inc., commenced an action against the water district for
inverse condemnation damages based on the taking or damaging of their property for a public use. The "taking" alleged
by the Niles Company was the flooding of the company's
gravel pits. In a separate action, the water district sought an
injunction against the mining operation for the waste of
water, in which the gravel pit operators counterclaimed,
Copyright@ 1975 by the University of Wyoming
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again seeking damages by way of inverse condemnation. The
actions were consolidated and the trial court ruled in favor of
the water district. The California Court of Appeal, First
District, affirming the judgment of the trial court, held that
the mining company's use of the water was burdened by a
public servitude, and that the sand and gravel company could
not be granted an inverse condemnation award because there
was no taking of property or in the alternative, held that the
water district's absolute control of waters within the basin
was a proper exercise of the state's police power.
This note will focus on disputes between overlying landowners and others with an interest in groundwater, where the
landowner's use of his land interferes with another's interests
in the groundwater.' These disputes have frequently arisen
as a result of a mining operation emoving water from its
mines to the detriment of other nearby landowners who wished
to make use of that water.
TRADITIONAL APPROACHES

To

INTERFERENCE WITH GROiUNDWATER

Alameda County Water Districtv. Niles Sand and Gravel
Co.' is the most recent of a long line of cases concerning the
problem of an overlying landowner using his lands in such
a way as to damage another's interests in groundwater. These
adjudications, commencing with the early English decision of
Acton v. Blundell,- have been based upon the groundwater
doctrine prevailing in the jurisdiction of that controversy.
Therefore, a brief explanation of the several groundwater
doctrines will be presented along with a review of the manner
in which jurisdictions adhering to each doctrine apply those
groundwater rules to disputes between the user of the overlying land and those whose interests in the subsurface water
have been injured by a landowner's use of his land. There
For the purposes of water rights, groundwater has been defined as, "All
water in the ground that is free to move by gravity, is capable of being
extracted from the ground, and susceptible of practicable legal control."
Hutchins, Trends in the Statutory Law of Ground Water in the Western
States, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 157 (1955).
2. 37 Cal. App. 3d 924, 112 Cal. Rptr. 846 (Ct. App. 1974).
8. 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843). Here the defendant, in removing water
from his mines, dried up the plaintiff's wells.
1.
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are four groundwater doctrines in use in the West: (1) the
common law rule of absolute ownership, (2) prior appropriation, (3) reasonable use, and (4) the California doctrine of
correlative rights.4 Though the doctrine of prior appropriation is followed in a majority of jurisdictions, all of these
doctrines play a significant role in the relationship between
the overlying landowner and the owner of the rights to the
subsurface water.
The two extreme rules are the English or common law
rule of absolute ownership and the doctrine of prior appropriation. The common law rule focuses on the ownership of
the overlying land. It is based on the maxim cujus est solum,
ejus est usque ad inforos or "to whomever the soil belongs,
he also owns to the sky, and to the depths." 5 Under this rule,
followed by Texas and some eastern states,' the overlying
landowner may dig or drill and apply everything found below
to his own pleasure with very little limitation on that right.!
At the other extreme is the doctrine of prior appropriation.
Here the focus of the law is on the xights in the water rather
than the rights in the ownership of the soil. This doctrine,
followed by the largest number of western states,8 applies the
law of surface waters to groundwater. The groundwaters
of the state belong to the public and may be appropriated
for a beneficial use? Once appropriated, the water belongs
to the appropriator subject to its continued beneficial use
with the courts preventing any interference with the appropriator's prior right.
The remaining two doctrines are merely judicial modifications of the common law rule of absolute ownership. The
so called American rule, or rule of reasonable use, was first
4. Clark, Western Ground-Water Law, 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 441
at 412 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
5. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 70 P. 663, 665 (1902).
6. Clark, GroundwaterManagevnent: Law and Local Response, 6 ARIz. L. REv.
178,183 (1965).
7. Clark & Martz, Classes of Water and Characterof Water Rights and Uses,
1 WATERS AN WATER RIGHTS § 52.2 at 328 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
8. Clark, Ground Water Legislation in Light of Experience in the Western
States, 22 MONT. L. REv. 42, 50 (1960).
9. State ex rel. Bliss v. Dority, 55 N.M. 12, 225 P.2d 1007, 1009 (1950). The
court upheld the permit system for appropriation as it applied to groundwater.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1975

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 10 [1975], Iss. 2, Art. 6

492

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. X

pronounced by the New Hampshire Supreme Judicial Court
in Bassett v. Salisbury Mamufacturing Co.'" and is followed
in the West by Arizona and Oklahoma. 1 This rule recognizes
the overlying landowner's right to extract subsurface water
from his land, but limits his xight to such quantity as might
be necessary for a useful purpose.1 2 This limitation is analogous to the beneficial use limitation of the appropriation
doctrine.
It was the rule of correlative rights which the court
purported to apply in Alaimeda County Water Districtv. Niles
Sand and Gravel Co.' This rule, first applied as to overlying
landowners in Katz v. Walkinhaw,"4 is that the waters in a
basin belong to all the overlying landowners in common and
each landowner may use only his reasonable share when there
is insufficient water to meet the entire demand. 5 The rule
recognizes a property right of the overlying landowner in
the waters, but this right is subject to the dual limitations of
reasonable use and correlation of the landowner 's right with
the rights of other overlying landowners. The correlative
rights doctrine, then, attempts to reach a middle ground,
recognizing the interests of the overlying landowner in the
water beneath his land along with the interests of others in
that water.
Disputes arising because of a landowner's interference
with water below his land are generally governed by the doctrine of groundwater use followed in that jurisdiction. In
those states applying the common law or English rule, the
overlying owner may use the water and interfere with its free
flow with impunity."; This unlimited right to the water flowing beneath his land arises from the view that in these jurisdictions sub-surface water is considered to be part of the land
10.
11.
12.
18.
14.
15.
16.

43 N.H. 569 (1862).
Clark & Martz, supra note 7, at 330.
Hutchins, supra note 1, at 162.
37 Cal. App. 3d 924, 112 Cal. Rptr. 846 (Ct. App. 1974).
141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903).
Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17, 29 (1949).
Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520, 527 (1866). The court here analogized the
law governing an overlying landowner's use of groundwater to the use of
his land.
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and follows from the right to do with one's own property as
one wishes. 7
Under the rule of reasonable use, jurisdictions in the
water-rich east have held that mining operations may interfere
with the flow of waters beneath their land. This has been considered a legitimate or reasonable use of that land. 8 The
concept that mining interference with underground waters
is reasonable has apparently been approved in one western
jurisdiction following this rule of reasonable use, though
merely in dicta. 9
As previously stated, the doctrine of priotr appropriation
focuses on, and protects, the rights of the owner of the water
rights. Courts in considering interference with underground
water by a user of the overlying land, such as a mining operation, will first ascertain which is the senior appropriative
right, and protect that right from all interference. 0 In those
states following the prior appropriation doctrine for groundwaters, all groundwater belongs to the state." Once a right
to water is obtained from the state, it is a vested property
right in the appropriator subject to continued beneficial use,
with the definition of beneficial use determined by the courts
of that state."
California has indicated a willingness to protect the interests of those other than the overlying landowner in groundwater. As demonstrated above, the California doctrine of correlative rights gives the overlying landowner an interest in his
fair share of the waters beneath his land. Thus an overlying
landowner engaged in a mining operation may interfere with
only his reasonable share of the water, leaving for others
their fair portion of the groundwater supply.2" In Eckel v.
17. Id.
18. Sycamore Coal Co. v. Stanley, 292 Ky. 168, 166 S.W.2d 293, 294 (1942).
Here the coal company's test bore interfered with the plaintiff's well.
19. Canada v. City of Shawnee, 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694, 697 (1936). This was
a dispute between a landowner and a city whose wells dried up the plaintiff's wells. The city was enjoined from exporting water off their land to
the city.
20. Clark, supra note 4, § 446 at 472.
21. State ex rel. Erickson v. McLean, 62 N.M. 264, 308 P.2d 983. 987 (1957).
22. Id., 308 P.2d at 989.
23. Eckel v. Springfield Tunnel & Development Co., 87 Cal. App. 617, 262 P.
425, 427 (Ct. App. 1927); O'Leary v. Herbert, 5 CaL 2d 416, 55 P.2d 834,
838 (1936).
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Springfield Tunnel & Development Co. a mining company,
which had invested neary $900,000 in its mine, was enjoined
from draining its mine unless it could supply the plaintiff,
whose spring and creek dried up upon commencement of the
draining of the mine, with a sufficient quantity of water to
irrigate his lands. 4 This remedy was ordered even though
the court admitted that the mining operator derived greater
benefit from his use that did the plaintiff. 5 The California
Supreme Court was presented with a similar situation in
O'Leary v. Herbert, where a mining company was enjoined
from draining its mines to the detriment of other users of that
water.2 6 California, therefore, protects the overlying landowner's interests in subsurface water to the extent that his use
is reasonable, i.e. not waste,2" and does not interfere with
the rights of others to their share of that water. Each landowner is entitled to his share of the water and whoever is prior
in time is immaterial. The application of this rule effectively
prevents the total evacuation of water from mines if this
interferes with others unless the mining interest purchases
the rights to all the water in the basin.
THE PUBLIC SERVITUDE

In Alameda County 'Water District v. Niles Sand and
Gravel Co. the mining operator was not using all the available
groundwater supply to the detriment of the other overlying
landowners though it was -interfering with the rights of
others. The Alameda County Water District was vested with
very broad, but well defined statutory powers concerning the
management of the Niles Basin." Based on an interpretation
of these statutory powers and an application of the doctrine of
correlative rights, the trial court concluded, and the appellate
court affirmed, that the obligation of reasonable use from
the correlative rights doctrine and the management of the
24.
25.26.
27.
28.

87 Cal. App. 617, 262 P. 425, 428 (Ct. App. 1927).

Id..
5 Cal. 2d 416, 55 P.2d 834, 839 (1936).
Id., 55 P.2d at 838.
CAL. WATEi CODE § 30000 et eq. (West 1956). Special powers were given
the Alameda County Water District by the state legislature in 1961. Ch.
1942, [1961] Cal. Stat. 4092. These powers relate to groundwater replenishment within the district.
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water by a public agency imposes a "public servitude" on
the landowners in the Niles Basin." The court defined "servitude" as, "[S] uch obligations when imposed by law, and
limiting the use of lands lying in a particuar geographical
area, where an overriding public interest requires it.""
Rather than using the previously explained land use versus
water rights concepts as developed under the California
doctrine, the court stated that the Niles Company was subject to this public servitude.
It can fairly be said that the doctrine of correlative rights
which limits each landowner's use of groundwater beneath
his land to a reasonable use thereof, imposes a servitude upon
that overlying landowner. "Servitude" has been defined in
California as a right which subjects property to some service
for the use of another's property. 1 The application of the
correlative rights principle and its limitations as to reasonable
2 could be said to impose a seruse as in O'Leary v. Herbert"
vitude on the xight of each subsurface water user in California,
but, as will be discussed below, the declaration of a servitude
in the Niles case may have heralded too expansive a doctrine.
It was undisputed at the trial that the water district owned the groundwater in the Niles Basin as "trustee"
for all overlying surface owners within the basin.8" This
trusteeship was found implicit in the powers given to the
district in 1961." 4 These special powers include the authority
to "take any action necessary" to prevent interference with
the water,8" to store water underground for "the common benefit of the district,'" to commence or intervene in actions begun to prevent interference with, dimunition, pollution, or
unlawful exportation of, any water in the district.8 7 These
29. Alameda County Water District v. Niles Sand and Gravel Co., 37 Cal. App.
3d 924, 934, 112 Cal. Rptr. 846, 853 (Ct App. 1974).
80. Id.
31. Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 68 P. 908, 312 (1902).
32. 5 Cal. 2d 416, 55 P.2d 834, 839 (1936).
33. Alameda County Water District v. Niles Sand and Gravel Co., 37 Cal.
App. 3d 924, 929 n.5, 112 Cal. Rptr. 846, 849 n.5 (Ct. App. 1974).
34. Ch. 1942, [1961] Cal Stat. 4092.
35. Ch. 1942, § 3, [1961] Cal. Stat. 4094.
36. Ch. 1942, § 4(b), [1961) Cal. Stat. 4094.
37. Ch. 1942, § 4(e), [1961] Cal. Stat. 4094-95.
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powers then, gave the water district the authority and responsibility to enforce this servitude.
Implicit in the court's reasoning is that it is not in the
public interest to allow an individual corporation to pump
out of a common supply five million gallons of water per day,
permitting fresh water to be wasted into San Francisco Bay.
It has long been held in California, 8 as elsewhere," that
waste of water is not a reasonable or beneficial use. Commentators have frequently urged that the public interest requires effective public management of groundwater basins."
Basin management by a state agency is vital in California
where water is a scarce commodity. The state's vast population is using more and more water each day, and California
is in the midst of a long drought. Therefore, it is in the
"public interest" to have governmental control over these
basins to prevent waste of the waters. The California Supreme Court has said, "[P]ublic interest requires that there
be the greatest number of benefical uses which the supply can
yield. '"' Certainly such a public interest does not include
pumping five million gallons of valuable fresh water per day
into San Francisco Bay.
The "public servitude" as pronounced in Niles is quite
similar to the state navigation servitude in California as announced in Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Department of Public
Works.4 2 The public purpose doctrine of the state navigation
servitude announced in Colberg requires merely a public
purpose for the state to invoke the servitude.4 3 This view of
the navigation servitude also is based on the determination
38. O'Leary v. Herbert, 5 Cal. 2d 416, 55 P.2d 834, 838 (1936).
39. Eden Irrigation Co. v. District Court of Weber County, 61 Utah 103, 211
P. 957, 961 (1922). The Supreme Court of Utah upheld a statute prohibiting waste of water, saying no one can acquire a vested right to waste
water.
40. Clark, supra note 8, at 55; Krieger & Banks, Ground Water Basin Manage-ment, 50 CAL. -L.REv. 56, 77 (1962); Reis, A Review and Revitalization:
Concepts of Ground Water Production.and Management-The California
Experience, 7_NATURAL RESOURCES J. 53, 85 .(1967).
41. Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17, 28 (1949).
42. 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967). The California Supreme Court denied a declaratory judgment for relief from the building of
bridges which would severely limit the plaintiff's shipyard business.
43. Comment, The State Navigation Servitude, 4 LAND & WATER L. REv. 521,
537 (1969).
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that the state holds the navigable waterways and the lands
beneath them as "trustee of a public trust for the benefit of
the people." 44 The state navigation servitude as interpreted
by the California courts is much like the "public servitude"
protected by the Alameda County Water District. The
similarity between these servitudes is no coincidence for the
court of appeal was well aware of the Colberg case when formulating its opinion. 5
It is submitted that the "public servitude" proclaimed
by the court in Niles was not solely based on an application
of the correlative rights doctrine and the powers of the water
district. It is this author's opinion that the court also considexred the public interest and the needs of the state to manage
the total water program. A public servitude was declared
to indicate the judiciary's approval of centralized management of water use in California--especially groundwater.4"
Thus the court developed a doctrine that is substantially similar in scope to the public purpose doctrine of the state navigation servitude in Caifornia.
DENIAL OF INVERSE CONDEMNATION

That the court denied the Niles Company its requested
relief of inverse condemnation follows logically from the declaration of a public servitude on water rights in the Niles
Basin. In refusing the Niles Company's plea for inverse condemnation, the court of appeal based its decision on two
alternative grounds. The first ground for the decision was
that there was no taking or damaging of the mining company Is
property." This was predicated on the conditional use permit issued by the City of Fremont to the mining operator
which stated that the company "shall cooperate with the
Alameda County Water District to the end that the- water
44. Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel.- Department of Public Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408,
432 P.2d 3; 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967).
45. Alameda County Water District v. Niles Sand and Gravel Co., 37 Cal. App.
3d, 924, 934, 112 Cal. Rptr, 846, 853 (Ct. App. 1974).
46. Cf. Reis, A Review and Revitalizafion:' Conwept8 of Ground Water Production and Management-The California Experience, 7 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 53, 55 (1967).
47. Alameda County Water District v. Niles Sand and Gravel Co., 37 Cal. App.
3d 924, 935, 112 Cal. Rptr. 846, 854 (Ct. App. 1974).
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pumped in connecion with . . . [their] . . . operations shall
not be wasted to San Francisco Bay nor shall ground water
percolation capacity be diminished in quality or quantity."4 8
Because of this provision in the use permit and the water
district's duty to prevent waste, the court concluded that the
quarry owners had no property interest which had been taken
or damaged.49
As an alternative theory, the court denied inverse condemnation because the district's actions were a proper exercise of the state's police powers."0 The court of appeal's
rationale was that the California Constitution expressly prohibits waste or unreasonable use of water. 1 This prohibition,
the court claimed, was not a taking or damaging of property
but rather regulation of the use and enjoyment of a property
right and therefoire, a legitimate exercise of the state's police
power."
It is conceded that the first basis for denying inverse
condemnation is valid, that being based on the express agreement between the sand and gravel company and the City
of Fremont. The second, or alternative basis for denying inverse condemnation, though, bears a more thorough examination. The California Constitution declares the state's interest in the reasonable and beneficial use of the waters of
the state and the prevention of the waste of these waters. 3 It
has long been held under this constitutional provision that
the prevention of an unreasonable use is a valid exercise of
the police power of the state and thus not a compensable
taking for a public use,54 but-rather a limitation on the use of
one's property.5 The considering of a state's regulation of
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 927 n.3, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 848 n.3.
Id. at 935, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
Id.
CAL' CONST. art 14, § 3. "The right to water or to the use or flow of water
- . does not extend to waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method
of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water."
Alameda County Water District v. Niles Sand and Gravel Co., 37 Cal. App.
3d 924, 936, 112 Cal. Rptr. 846, 854-55 (Ct. App. 1974).
CAL. CowsT. art. 14; § 3.
CAL. CONST. art 1, § 14. "Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation having first been made to . . .
the owner .
Gin S. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 22 P.2d 5, 18 (1933).
The court in this action declared that requiring water to be put to a
reasonable use was a legitimate exercise of the police power.
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the use of its natural resources as a non-compensable exercise
of the police power is not limited to California.5 6 The California courts, though, have carried this concept further than
most.57
The court, in according the alternative ground for denying
compensation, presupposed that the company had a property
right in the groundwater which was damaged. If the Niles
Company was indeed injured by the water district, the courts
in California have again extended the police power beyond
the usual bounds. Traditionally, any "taking" or "damaging" of property for a public use is compensable, 8 but the taking of one's use of his property, where that use is harming
another is generally not compensable.5 9 Commenators have
argued that state control of groundwater basins should be
obtained by the use of eminent domain powers, and the property owners should receive compensation for public infringement of their water rights.6" Other courts also have rejected
the California approach to this problem. 1
Because the court of appeal imposed a public servitude
on water use in the Niles Basin, denial of inverse condemnation logically follows. The interests of the overlying landowners are servient to the interests of the water district,
which embodies the public interest. Since the uses made of
this subsurface water now become subject to a public agency's
determination of what is reasonable, the court could apply
previous decisions, such as Colb erg 2 or Joslin v. Marin Mun56. E.g. Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp. v. Corporation Comm'r, 205 Okla. 672,
241 P.2d 363, 372 (1951).
57. See Joslin v. Matin Municipal Water District, 67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889,
60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967), where the California Supreme Court denied inverse condemnation relief to the plaintiff whose business depended upon
a stream carrying rocks, sand and gravel to his land. The defendant
built a dam and thus prevented the stream from carrying any more material to the plaintiff's lands. See also Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Department of Public Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967).
58. Harnsberger, Eminent Domain and Water Law, 48 NEB. L. _9Ev. 325, 342
(1969).
59. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928).
60. Reis, aupra note 46, at 85.
61. Wernberg v. State, 516 P.2d 1191, 1197 (Alaska 1973); Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 427 S.W.2d 213, 215-17 (Ky. 1968). Both courts criticized the application of the state navigation servitude as in Colberg, Inc. v. State ez rel.
Department of Public Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1967).
62. Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Department of Public Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408,
432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967).
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icipal Water District., to deny any compensation to the users
of groundwater.
It is submitted that the court of appeal reached the
proper decision in this case because of the conditional use
permit but that the court went too far in declaring a public
servitude, and in its broad statements about the police power
of the state. The latter holding makes the Niles case an imminent threat to all holders of water rights in groundwater
basins in California. It is recognized that groundwater is a
valuable and scarce commodity in California, as it is throughout the arid lands of the western United States, but this would
seem to be no reason to make the broad pronouncements concerning the public servitude and the police power of the state
which were made in the Niles ease. There are alternatives
available.
The need for planned, coordinated development and utilization of groundwater resources is widely recognized. 4 But
judicial response to this need should not deprive the owner of
water rights in subsurface water of all interest in that water
as was done in the Niles case. By imposing the public servitude, the court has vested in the water district absolute control over water use in the basin. This goes far beyond
the statutory power given the district to protect rights in the
water within the framework of the correlative rights doctrine.6" Potentially, in a subsequent decision, a court could
use the broad pronouncements in the Niles case to deny compensation to a legitimate water right holder when a public
agency takes his water.
As indicated above, the court based the declaration of this
servitude on the public purpose interpretation of the state
navigation servitude.. This development in the state naviga63. Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District, 07 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60
Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967)..
64. Hutchins, Ground Water "Legislation, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REv.- 416, 437
(1958); Clark, supra note 8.
65. CAi. WATER CODE § 30000 et seq. (West 1956); Ch. 1942, §4(c), [1961]
Cal. Stat. 4094-95.

66. Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Department of Public Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408,
432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967).
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It has been
Lion servitude idea has been widely criticized."
said that this broad interpretation of the servitude hinders the
development of property,"8 placing the costs of public development on private parties.69 These same criticisms apply
to the public servitude imposed in the Niles Basin. This
court, it seems, failed to heed the warning of Professor Coase
in his influential article on cost-benefit analysis to look beyond
the immediate consequences of a decision. "[I]n choosing
between social arrangements within the context of which individual decisions are made, we have to bear in mind that
a change in the existing system which will lead to an improvement in some decisions may well lead to a worsening of
others." 0 As a result of Niles, extreme caution will develop
among those users of groundwater within a groundwater
basin over which a state regulatory agency has some control.
Owners will be hesitant to invest further in the use of groundwater as there will be the ever present danger that, as greater
and greater needs develop for their water, a court may find
that their rights too are subject to a public servitude and take
away their investment without compensation. The ultimate
result of this doctrine is that the cost of public development
and control of these valuable groundwater resources is borne
solely by those who initially developed and used these resources
rather than spread among those who (the public) will derive
the benefit from the expanded public use of these resources.
This approach will make it frightfully easy for a state agency,
vested with moderate power and a "public purpose," to take
control of the state's groundwaters and control and prohibit
uses as it sees fit.
The potential dangers of this doctrine are not limited
solely to California. This public servitude could be imposed
with relative ease in almost any of the western states. The
beneficial use doctrine of the appropriation states and the
reasonable use limitations of the riparian states are highly
67. See Wernberg v. State, 516 P.2d 1191, 1197 n.28 (Alaska 1973).
68. Comment, supra note 43, at 537.
69. Corker, Federal-State Relations in Water Rights Adjudication and Admirn.
istration, 17 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 579, 601 (1971).
70. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1, 44 (1960).
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susceptible to judicial interpretation.7 1 In addition, there is
the concept of the public interest, which has given rise to some
judicial utterances which are capable of being built upon."2
It would be a short step from such statements to the imposition
of a public servitude on the appropriators of groundwater.
It is submitted that this would be a significant threat to current uses of groundwater.
ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE

As previously stated, it is believed that the proper result
was obtained in this case. What remains to be explored is
whether any alternative means exist to reach the result of
Niles. Before discussing any other alternatives, it should be
reiterated that the first rationale of the court in Niles, that
the conditional use agrcement controlled the relationship between the parties, is a viable means of reaching the proper decision in this case. It is submitted that two other routes to
achieve the desired result were available to the court. The
first of these alternatives was for the court to focus on what
the Niles Company did with the water. It would seem that the
pumping of five million gallons of fresh water per day into
San Francisco Bay is waste no matter how water-rich an area
might be. Under any groundwater doctrine, except perhaps
the English rule of absolute ownership, waste is prohibited."
Waste is against the stated policy in the California Constitution.7 4 In addition, the couit could find that this waste was
harming others with property interests in the water. Thus,
the mining company's use of its water was reaching beyond
its property lines and harming others. This factor may be
made a basis for the taking of property without compensation." The court of appeal could have declared that this
71. Cf. Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District, 67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889,
898, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967).
72. See Southwest Engineering Co. v. Ernst, 79 Ariz. 403, 291 P.2d 764, 768
(1955) where the Arizona court said, "[W]here the public interest is
significantly involved, the preferment of that interest over the property
interest of the individual even to the extent of its destruction is a distinguishing characteristic of the police power."
73. Eden Irrigation Co. v. District Court of Weber County, 61 Utah 103, 211
P. 957, 961 (1922).

74. CAL. CONST. art. 14, § 3.
75. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). See also Sax, Takings, Private
Property and Publiev Rights, 81 YALE L. J. 149 (1971).
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waste of the water was not a reasonable use, thus the mining
company had no property interest which was impaired.
The second approach that might have been used would
be to apply the traditional analysis of the problem of land use
interfering with water rights. Here the court would be able
to apply the doctrine of Eckel v. Springfield Tunnel & Development Co.-that a water user may use only his reasonable
share of the water of the basin. 6 Though there would be
some problem with this approach, especially in a large basin
such as Niles, in determining the extent of an overlying owner's reasonable share, these problems have been overcome before." In California under the correlative rights doctrine,
the doctrine of the Eckel case would have to be used in conjunction with the reasonable use doctrine to deny the Niles
Company any water rights. In the appropriation states competing uses would not create this problem. If the mining
operator did not have the prior appropriation the courts could
simply enforce the appropriation. If the operator held the
prior permit, then it is reasonable to require the public agency
to pay for the condemnation of that right, and the cost be borne
by the public who will benefit from the increased water
supply. In the Niles case, then, the court did not need to make
such broad proclamations about a "public servitude" existing
or the broad scope of the state's police power.
WARREN E. BERGHOLZ, JR.

76. 87 Cal. App. 617, 262 P. 425, 428 (Ct. App. 1929).
77. Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949). Here the dispute was turned over to the Division of Water Resources, Department of
Public Works, State of California for determination of facts.
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